Astro Foorumi

The Taittiriya Upanishad
With the Commentaries of Śaṅkarāchārya, Sureśvarāchārya and Sāyaṇa (Vidyāraṇya.)

     / Book III - Bhṛguvallī
     / Chapter IV - Final Attainment

Chapter IV - Final Attainment

The Ātman is ever beyond Saṃsāra.

[Page 776] Having thus, from the stand-point of illusory knowledge, taught the several contemplations, such as those which fall within the scope of the average aspirants, the commentator (Śaṅkarāchārya) now proceeds to expound the underlying truth, apart from all illusion.—(A).

In the section beginning with the words “Life, verily, is food, the body the food-eater,” the śruti has taught us that it is the evolved universe, including the ākāśa, which appears as food and food-eater.

(Question):—True, it has been taught. What of that?

(Answer):—From this it follows that the saṃsāra which is due (to the things in the universe) being mutually related as enjoyers and objects of enjoyment, pertains to the evolved universe, but not to the Ātman. It is only ascribed to Ātman through illusion.

This relation of food and food-eater belongs to the world of effects and therefore pertains to the aggregate of the principles comprising human upādhi. The śruti has taught this at length, with a view to show that that relation pertains only to the world of effects and that it should not be extended to Brahman who is beyond thought and words.—(S).

(The opponent):— [Page 777] The Ātman, too, is a thing evolved from the Paramātman, and it is therefore but right to say that saṃsāra pertains to the Self.

(Answer) No; for, the śruti speaks of the entrance of that one who is not a saṃsārin. “This having emanated, into that very thing He entered”: in these words the śruti declares the entrance in the universe, of the Paramātman Himself who has created ākāśa and other things and who is not a saṃsārin. Therefore the living self, the jīvātman, who has entered the universe, is none other than the Supreme, who is not a saṃsārin. And the identity of the agent in the acts of creating and entering leads to the same view. When the creation and the entrance are looked upon as the acts of one and the same agent, then alone does the participle, “having created,” become explicable.

(The opponent):—On entering, the Supreme undergoes change of nature.

(Answer):—No; for, we have refuted[1] this interpretation by shewing that entrance has quite a different meaning.

(The opponent):—As the śruti says specifically that the One has entered the universe “in this form of the jīva,”[2] the Supreme must have entered the universe with a different nature (as saṃsārin).

(Answer):— [Page 778] No, because the śruti again speaks of the jīva as identical with the One, in the words “That, Thou art.”

(The opponent):—There the śruti merely presents an exalted picture for contemplation, whereby the jīva who has come to be a distinct being (as saṃsārin) may rid himself of that distinct feature (saṃsāra).

(Answer):—No, because of the identity taught by the śruti in the words “That is real, That the Self, and That Thou art.”

That is to say, the opponent’s view is incompatible with the identity which the śruti, when literally interpreted, conveys, and which we find no reason to set aside.—(A).

(The opponent):—Why, our experience does shew that the jīva is a saṃsārin.

(Answer):—It cannot be; for the perceiver cannot be an object of perception.

(The opponent):—Why, the Self with his attribute of saṃsāra is perceived.

(Answer):—No; for, since an attribute is not distinct from its substratum, the Self would then be an object of perception as well as the perceiver; i. e., the Self would be both the agent and the object of the act of perceiving; which is impossible, just as it is impossible for heat to become heated and for light to become illumined.

(The opponent):— [Page 779] As the Self is found to be subject to fear, &c., we infer that the Self is subject to pain, &c.

(Answer):—For the very reason that fear and pain are perceived, they are not the attributes of the perceiver.

(The opponent):—This is opposed to the reasoning adopted by the followers of Kapila and Kaṇāda.

(Answer):—That does not vitiate our theory; for, as their systems lack proper foundation and contradict the Veda, we must look upon them as based on illusion.

Thus Ātman’s freedom from saṃsāra has been established both through śruti and reasoning.

Therefore the common view that the Self is the enjoyer of external objects should be relegated to the region of avidyā; such a relation cannot apply to the Ātman who is one with the Real Infinite Brahman. That the duality comprising the enjoyer and the objects of enjoyment arises from avidyā is taught by the śruti in the words “when there is, as it were, duality, then one sees the other, one hears the other, .........”.[3] And again in the words “But when the Self only is all this, how could he smell another, how could he see another.........” the śruti teaches that the Self who is free from avidyā and all such things is always free from duality ascribed to him by avidyā—(S).

 
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